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dc.contributor.authorCremonini, Marco; Nizovtsev, Dmitrien_US
dc.dateNovember 2007en_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-11-14en_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-11-02T14:38:16Z
dc.date.available2014-11-14en_US
dc.date.available2018-11-02T14:38:16Z
dc.identifier.otherSchool of Business Working Paper Series; No. 95en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://wuir.washburn.edu/handle/10425/235
dc.description.abstractThis paper examines information warfare between attackers, who try to gain access to information systems, or "targets", and defenders protecting those targets. we develop a game theoretic model in which both defenders and attackers act strategically and their actions are interdependent. our analysis focuses on the role of the information flows and shows that, ceteris paribus, rational attackers spend more effort on less protected targets. as a result, the defenders' security measures are more effective when attackers are informed about the targets' characteristics. Correctly anticipating future attackers' responses, targets with better levels of protection have stronger incentives to signal their security characteristics than poorly protected targets. Overall, defenders' ability to signal their security characteristics improves their welfare. our results have important implications for security practices and policies.en_US
dc.format.mediumPDFen_US
dc.language.isoEngen_US
dc.publisherWashburn University, School of Businessen_US
dc.subjectComputer securityen_US
dc.subjectCost-Benefit analysisen_US
dc.subjectEconomics of information systemsen_US
dc.subjectGame theoryen_US
dc.subjectInformation securityen_US
dc.subjectInformateion warfareen_US
dc.titleRole Of Signaling In Information Warfareen_US
dc.typeWorking paperen_US
washburn.identifier.cdm166en_US
washburn.identifier.oclc235273473en_US
washburn.source.locationen_US


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