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dc.contributor.authorHull, Robert M.; Kwak, Sungkyu; Walker, Rosemaryen_US
dc.dateFebruary 2008en_US
dc.date.accessioned2014-11-14en_US
dc.date.accessioned2018-11-02T14:38:16Z
dc.date.available2014-11-14en_US
dc.date.available2018-11-02T14:38:16Z
dc.identifier.otherSchool of Business Working Paper Series; No. 98en_US
dc.identifier.urihttps://wuir.washburn.edu/handle/10425/238
dc.description.abstractWe examine the impact of insider behavior that accompanies seasoned offerings (SEOs) and discover three unexpected findings. First, firms with greater insider ownership percentages underperform before SEOs compared to firms with lesser percentages. Second, insiders can use SEOs to maximize their own short-run welfare because the response to an SEO announcement does not depend on the "change" in insider ownership percentages but only on the "absolute" percentage that remains after the offering. Third, firms that undergo greater decreases in insider ownership perform much better after SEOs. This finding is economically and statistically significant suggesting that investors should be skeptical of insider ability to predict future performance. In fact, the evidence suggests investors should do just the opposite of insiders!en_US
dc.format.mediumPDFen_US
dc.language.isoEngen_US
dc.publisherWashburn University, School of Businessen_US
dc.subjectAnnouncement period stock returnsen_US
dc.subjectInside ownershipen_US
dc.subjectSeasoned equity offeringsen_US
dc.subjectSignaling theoryen_US
dc.subjectStock ownershipen_US
dc.titleDo Seasoned Offerings Really Signal Anything Significant From Insiders?en_US
dc.typeWorking paperen_US
washburn.identifier.cdm169en_US
washburn.identifier.oclc247143025en_US
washburn.source.locationen_US


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